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Abstract 
The legal regulation of same-sex parenting in England & Wales promotes the 
heteronormative model of women-led homonuclear families as the archetype of 
same-sex parenting. The law’s privileging of women-led same-sex parenting is 
evident in how the courts resolve collaborative co-parenting disputes where gay men 
and lesbians conceive a child together. This article analyses a number of recent 
collaborative co-parenting cases to argue that the judicial reasoning in these cases, 
which focuses on protecting the women-led homonuclear family, evidences a lack of 
proper regard for the ‘procreative consciousness’ of gay men.  
The article further argues that the lamentable lack of explicit judicial consideration of 
the interests of gay men involved in collaborative co-parenting reflects the gender-
based disparity perpetuated by the parenthood provisions of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008. These provide for the recognition without court 
involvement of women-led, homonuclear families but not male-led parenting. 
Therefore, courts must be sensitive to this disparity by explicitly considering the 
procreative consciousness of gay men, as they currently do with the potential 
vulnerability of women-led families. Only in this way, will judicial reasoning reflect the 
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various interests at stake in collaborative co-parenting arrangements rather than 
privileging a particular family form.   
 
1. Introduction 
The courts in England & Wales are increasingly being called upon to resolve gay and 
lesbian parenting disputes involving children born as a result of reproductive 
collaborations between single or partnered lesbians and gay men.2 These 
reproductive collaborations typically involve gay and lesbian individuals or couples 
who collaborate with other individuals or couples to conceive a child through assisted 
reproduction, either informally at home or formally in a clinic. A number of parenting 
arrangements might be envisaged when gay men and lesbians conceive in this way 
but the extent to which these are reflected in their parenting practices may vary. In 
this article, I am concerned with what is variously called poly-parenting or co-
parenting3 and which I refer to as collaborative co-parenting. In doing so my ambition 
is to stress the collaboration of all involved in the parenting project.4 The 
characteristic feature of collaborative co-parenting that sets it apart from other types 
of parenting following assisted reproduction is the intention that each of the ‘parents’, 
often more than two, will remain actively involved in the child’s life. The characteristic 
feature of the decided cases is that they concerned disputes between the putative 
parents5 about the levels of involvement that were agreed prior to conception. My 
concern is that the interests of the gay men involved in these arrangements are often 
                                            
2
 For a detailed discussion of the case law see L Smith, ‘Tangling the web of legal parenthood: legal 
responses to the use of known donors in lesbian parenting arrangements’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 
355. 
3
 See for example A Zanghellini, ‘Lesbian and Gay Parents and Reproductive Technologies: The 
2008 Australian and UK Reforms’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 227; D Cutas and S Chan, 
Families - Beyond the Nuclear Ideal (Bloomsbury Academic 2012) 
4
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Network 2012 – 2013)) and newspaper columns discussing lived experiences of collaborative co-
parenting (e.g. Charlie Condou, ‘The Three of Us’ The Guardian (July 2012)  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/series/the-three-of-us> accessed December 2016). 
5
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neglected in favour of the protection of women-led homonuclear6 families, which 
currently dominates judicial reasoning in these cases.  
In this article, I examine the legal regulation of collaborative co-parenting from the 
perspective of gay men’s ‘procreative consciousness’.7 My argument is that, in the 
context of collaborative co-parenting, the relevant legislation, judicial decisions and 
the academic critique fail to acknowledge the distinctive desire of gay men to parent. 
The article juxtaposes the parenting ambitions of gay fathers and those of women-
led parents. My intention is not to undermine the legal recognition of autonomous 
women-led parenting (and the great strides that have been made in that direction 
recently) but to advocate for greater awareness of and explicit reference to the 
needs of gay fathers in collaborative co-parenting arrangements. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. I start by analysing the fact that the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008) consciously includes recognition 
of women-led same-sex parenting but omits any reference to male-led same-sex 
parenting or collaborative co-parenting. That omission suggests that gay fathers, and 
indeed any contemplation of the plurality of queer families,8 were never properly 
considered when the legislation was passed, partly because of the reluctance to 
address issues relating to surrogacy and a reluctance to unsettle the well-
established principle that gestation results in legal parenthood.9 As Russell J 
remarked in the recent collaborative co-parenting case of H v S (Disputed Surrogacy 
Arrangements),10 ‘the lack of a properly supported and regulated framework for 
arrangements of this kind has, inevitably, led to an increase in these cases before 
                                            
6
 This term is used in the Australian case of Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contact) (2002) 28 
Fam LR 579 to denote a family where a lesbian couple have conceived a child which they raise 
together without the involvement of the biological father. For a discussion of this case see F Kelly, 
‘Redefining Parenthood : Gay and Lesbian Families in the Family Court — the Case of Re Patrick’ 
(2002) 16 Australian Journal of Family Law 1. 
7
 A notion first advanced by psychologists based in the USA: see W Marsiglio, ‘Male Procreative 
Consciousness and Responsibility: A Conceptual Analysis and Research Agenda’ (1991) 12 Journal 
of Family Issues 268; Dana Berkowitz and William Marsiglio, ‘Gay Men: Negotiating Procreative, 
Father, and Family Identities’ (2007) 69 Journal of Marriage and Family 366. 
8
 For more on this see V Lehr, Queer Family Values: Debunking the Myth of the Nuclear Family 
(Temple University Press 1999). 
9
 See J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the 
Tenacity of the Sexual Family Form’ (2010) 73 (2) MLR 175. Genuine engagement with the 
procreative consciousness of gay men would necessitate a review of the current legal framework 
which fails to accommodate the complexities of surrogacy and in particular international surrogacy.   
10
 [2015] EWFC 36, [2016] 1 FLR 723. 
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the Family Court’.11 The legislative framework, therefore, forms a key part of the 
legal context in which collaborative co-parenting cases are being decided.  
Given the absence of legislative recognition of the interests of gay fathers, I go on to 
address the way in which courts have, and ought to have, responded to this 
omission. Using the lens of gay men’s procreative consciousness, I analyse the 
recent case of H v S12 to argue that, although a desirable outcome may have been 
achieved, the judicial reasoning supporting this outcome did not reflect a genuine 
engagement with the interests of gay fathers. I suggest that, were judges to be more 
aware of the procreative consciousness of gay men, they would be inclined to give 
greater weight to their interests as fathers in collaborative co-parenting disputes. 
This does not necessarily require judges to enquire into the specificity of men’s 
experiences of reproduction but simply to consider explicitly gay men as reproductive 
beings in their own right.13 This in turn would provide reassurance that courts were 
fully taking account of and giving proper recognition to the interests that gay men, 
like lesbians, have in conceiving and raising children in collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements.   
The critique that I offer in this article addresses itself to the commentary on the cases 
that have been written by other scholars. As I have indicated, my concern has been 
that the courts do not acknowledge the procreative consciousness of gay men. 
However, it seems to me that scholars critical of judges have also failed to make 
adequate provision for that procreative consciousness. Many of these critiques 
suggest that, in ‘imposing’ fathers on women-led families, judges are reinforcing a 
heteronormative model of the family. My position is that these critiques fail to allow 
space for gay men’s procreative consciousness. My analysis concentrates on Re G 
(A Minor); Re Z (A Minor).14 I problematize analyses of this case which appear to me 
to be too quick to assume heteronormative influences on the judicial resolution of 
collaborative co-parenting disputes. In adopting this position, I take issue with the 
way in which some commentators have deployed the concept of heteronormativity 
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 [2015] EWFC 36, [2016] 1 FLR 723. 
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 In other words, gay men have their own desires, wishes and experiences in relation to having 
children that are not mediated through women. 
14
  [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR 1334. 
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as a lens through which to critique collaborative co-parenting cases. The complexity 
inherent in collaborative co-parenting cases and, what is more, the contested nature 
of heteronormativity as a theoretical construct necessitate a more nuanced approach 
to the interpretation of judicial dicta in relation to same-sex parenting disputes. I am 
particularly concerned that genuine judicial attempts to engage with the interests of 
gay fathers (even though this may not have been what happened in Re G; Re Z)15 
should not be dismissed in academic critique as disguised attempts to impose 
fathers on women led families. 
The object of this three-stage analysis is to contribute a perspective which is missing 
from current research on same sex parenting. There is a considerable body of 
academic research that has been conducted on autonomous women-led parenting.16 
This is not, I submit, reflected in a comparable level of research into the interests of 
gay men as parents.17 A number of these studies have referred to gay men’s 
involvement in the conception of children but these have tended to focus on their role 
in facilitating women-led families. Studies that explore the families of lesbians and 
gay men who conceived children together tend to focus on the kinship relationships 
they establish with one and other rather than their legal relationship.18  This article, 
by contrast, presents a more sustained focus on the importance of judicial 
cognisance of the procreative consciousness of gay men involved in conceiving 
children in a collaborative co-parenting arrangement. I do not see this as a 





 See for example P Nordqvist and C Smart, Relative strangers : family life, genes and donor 
conception (Palgrave Macmillan 2014); L Smith, ‘Is Three a Crowd: Lesbian Mothers’ Perspectives on 
Parental Status in Law’ (2006) 18 CFLQ 231; K Arnup and Susan B Boyd, ‘Familial Disputes? Sperm 
Donors, Lesbian Mothers and Legal Parenthood’ in D Herman and C Stychin (eds), Legal Inversions 
(Temple University Press 1995); H Bos, ‘Lesbian Mother Families Formed Through Donor-
Insemination’ in A Goldberg and K Allen (eds), LGBT-Parent Families: Innovations in Research and 
Implications for Practice (Springer 2013); A Cameron, ‘“A chip off the old (ice) block?: Women-led 
families, sperm donors and family law”’ in J Kilty (ed), Women and the Law (Canadian Scholar’s Press 
2013); Catherine Donovan, ‘Who Needs a Father? Negotiating Biological Fatherhood in British 
Lesbian Families Using Self-Insemination’ (2000) 3 Sexualities 149; G Dunne, ‘Opting into 
Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and 
Kinship’ (2000) 14 Gender & Society 11; F Kelly, ‘Autonomous from the start : single mothers by 
choice in the Canadian legal system’ (2012) 24 CFLQ 257. 
17
 There are some notable exceptions, for example, A Goldberg, Gay Dads: Transitions to Adoptive 
Fatherhood (New York University Press 2012); and G Mallon, Gay Men Choosing Parenthood 
(Columbia University Press 2004). However, these have largely been about adoption.  
18
 See for example D Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and Negotiating Reproductive Relationships: Lesbians 
and Gay Men Forming Families with Children’ (2010) 44 Sociology 1145 and D Dempsey, ‘More like a 
donor or more like a father? Gay men’s concepts of relatedness to children’ (2012) 15 Sexualities 156 
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resurgence of heteronormative influences on same-sex families.19 Rather my 
intention is to align myself with scholars, like Daniel Monk, who suggest that we 
should better appreciate the complexity of ‘potentially “hidden stories” of 
contemporary gay and lesbian connections with children within legal frameworks 
premised on equality’ but which ‘take place outside of statutory reform agendas and 
litigation strategies’.20 
2. Background Context: Gender and Power in Collaborative Co-
Parenting Disputes 
This article is arguing for greater sensitivity to the affective experiences of gay men 
in the context of collaborative co-parenting arrangements. As such, there is little 
discussion of the emotional investment (let alone financial/economic position) of 
lesbian mothers. As Richard Collier puts it in the context of his discussion of fathers' 
rights activism: 
 
[w]hat may appear at first sight to be 'lost'...are the structural contexts, 
the gendered nature and materiality of men's and women's lives, as 
well as, importantly, consideration of how gendered ideas of 
parenthood are historically grounded within social contexts shaped by 
relations of power.21 
 
Collier argues, however, that '[d]rawing attention to the complexity and gendered 
dimensions of men's experiences does not by itself detract from recognition of how 
power relations remain fundamental...'22 Instead, he suggests that this 'can be part of 
a wider project seeking to contribute to contemporary feminist engagements with 
law'.23  
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 Which is what Harding is concerned judges are doing: R Harding, ‘(Re)inscribing the 
Heteronormative Family’ in Robert Leckey (ed), After legal equality: family, sex, kinship (Routledge 
2015) 186. 
20
 D Monk, ‘Sexuality and Children Post-Equality’ in Robert Leckey (ed), After legal equality: family, 
sex, kinship (Routledge 2015) 201. 
21
 R Collier, 'Men, Gender and Fathers' Rights "After Legal Equality" in R Leckey (Ed), After Legal 
Equality (Routledge 2015) p 66. 
22





Therefore, while I do not explicitly address the impact of gendered power relations in 
this article, the broader socio-legal context surrounding co-parenting disputes 
remains highly relevant. It is important to bear in mind, for example, that '[e]ven as 
more mothers participate in the labour force and more fathers take an interest in 
children, women carry disproportionate responsibility for care labour and for 
children'.24 Despite this, the gendered way in which parenting operates in many 
families is obscured by the law’s focus on formal equality. As Susan Boyd et al. note: 
 
While most feminists and most women support the notion that men 
have the same capacity to parent as women, the question of imposed 
equality in this field is more problematic. The reality of women's 
typically greater responsibility for childcare cedes to the powerful idea 
that women and men are equally able to parent.25 
 
This tension between prioritising formal equality between parents and prioritising the 
legal recognition of caregiving features prominently in post-separation parenting 
disputes. Indeed, fathers’ rights claims are often based on the recognition of status 
based on biology without any explicit consideration of caregiving.26   
It is important to acknowledge the discursive power of fathers and knowledge of 
genetic identity when legal disputes about parenting occur and the potential threat 
this presents to autonomous women-led parenting. As Boyd et al. highlight, ‘[a] 
further potential constraint on women’s choice is the “almost unassailable 
presumption” that children have a right to know their genetic origins in an age of 
widely available DNA genetic testing’.27 This has resulted in single mothers by choice 
                                            
24
 S Boyd, 'Still Gendered After All This Time: Care and Autonomy in Child Custody Debates' in N 
Priaulx and A Wrigley (eds), Ethics, Law and Society: Volume V (Ashgate 2013) p 70. See also R 
Collier and S Sheldon, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (Hart 2008) p 128 - 132.  
25
 S Boyd, D Chunn, F Kelly and W Wiegers, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study of 
Choice and Constraint (University of Toronto Press 2015) p 9. 
26
 See for example C Smart ‘The Ethic of Justice Strikes Back: Changing Narratives of Fatherhood’ in 
A Diduck and K O’Donovan, Feminist Perspectives in Family Law  (Routledge 2006); R Collier, 
'Fathers 4 Justice, law and the new politics of fatherhood' (2005) 17 CFLQ 511; R Collier 'The fathers' 
rights movement, law reform and the new politics of fatherhood: Reflections on the UK experience' 
(2009) 20 Journal of Law and Public Policy 65; R Collier and S Sheldon (eds), Fathers' Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart 2006). 
27
 S Boyd, D Chunn, F Kelly and W Wiegers, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study of 
Choice and Constraint (University of Toronto Press 2015) p 19. See also C Smart 'Law and the 
Regulation of Family Secrets' (2010) 24 (3) IJLPF 397. 
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experiencing a sense of vulnerability in relation to their legal position.28 At the same 
time, however, gay men in collaborative co-parenting disputes are 'reproductive 
outsiders'29 and as such may be more vulnerable than the relatively more powerful 
lesbian mothers. According to Biblarz and Stacey, for example, ‘gay male parents 
challenge dominant practices of masculinity, fatherhood, and motherhood more than 
lesbian co-mothers depart from normative femininity or maternal practice’.30 In 
arguing for greater acknowledgement and recognition of gay men’s procreative 
consciousness in the context of collaborative co-parenting my intention, therefore, is 
not to diminish the possibilities of autonomous women-led parenting or to minimise 
the importance of recognising caregiving. I am rather suggesting that this is one 
currently neglected consideration that needs to be taken into account in order to 
reflect the stake each of the parents has in being involved with and caring for their 
children.       
3. Same-Sex Parenting and the Legislative Framework 
While it is laudable that same-sex parenting is being recognised legislatively to a 
greater extent than ever before, it is important not to overlook the way that the 
legislative framework privileges some forms of same-sex parenting over others. 
Autonomous women-led parenting has become fairly well embedded in the legal 
imagination.31 Gay men, on the other hand, feature much less prominently. The fact 
that the parenthood provisions of HFEA 2008 only expressly deal with women-led 
parenting demonstrates this most explicitly. Since the coming into force of the HFEA 
2008 it has been possible for single women and female partners to register as the 
only legal parent(s) of a child from birth, without any court involvement.32 This option, 
however, is not open to single men or male couples; the child’s birth mother is 
                                            
28
 F Kelly, ‘Autonomous Motherhood and the Law: Exploring the Narratives of Canada's Single 
Mothers by Choice’ (2012) 28 Canadian Journal of Family Law 63. 
29
 J Millbank, ‘Unlikely Fissures and Uneasy Resonances: Lesbian Co-Mothers, Surrogate 
Parenthood and Fathers’ Rights’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 141, 143. 
30
 T Biblarz and J Stacey 'How Does the Gender of Parents Matter?' (2010) 72 Journal of Marriage & 
Family 3. 
31
 For more on the limitations and assimilationist approach of the legal imagination in this regard see 
C Jones, ‘The Impossible Parents in Law’ in C Lind and others (eds), Taking Responsibility, Law and 
the Changing Family (Ashgate Publishing 2011); See also J Wallbank and C Dietz, ‘Lesbian mothers, 
fathers and other animals: is the political personal in multiple parent families?’ [2013] CFLQ 451, 459.  
32
 HFEA 2008, ss 42 – 44. 
9 
 
always a legal parent at birth.33 This suggests that, rather than attempting to address 
the needs of same-sex parents generally, the legislation focuses primarily on the 
legal recognition of lesbian parenting. This is reinforced by the fact that in the 
parliamentary debates around these parenthood provisions, ‘same-sex couple’ was 
often treated as synonymous with ‘female same-sex couple’ and often used 
alongside ‘single mother’ without any discussion of single male parents.34  
This conflation is more apparent in the explanatory note accompanying Part Two of 
the 2008 Act which states that it is ‘intended to put same sex couples and unmarried 
opposite sex couples in the same position as married couples.’35 However, it is only 
able to highlight the specific provisions that do this for female same-sex couples36 as 
there are no equivalent provisions for male couples. It is, then, specifically ‘same sex 
female couples’ that ‘are put on … the same legal footing … as their equivalent 
opposite-sex unmarried couples.’37 Baker J expressed a similar understanding of the 
2008 Act in Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor),38 where he stated that parliament’s 
intention in enacting this legislative reform was ‘to put lesbian couples and their 
children in exactly the same legal position as other types of parent and children.’39 
The same cannot be said of male couples.   
Male partners who satisfy the conditions of the Act (in the context of surrogacy) can, 
nevertheless, apply for a parental order.40 This makes them – and not the gestational 
mother – the legal parents. However, this court-based process adds an extra level of 
complication and bureaucracy which gay men must navigate to become parents.41 A 
male same-sex couple can never automatically be recognised as the parents of a 
                                            
33
 Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 33. 
34
 See for example Hansard Commons Debates, cols. 186–187, 20 May 2008. 
35
 Explanatory Note, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, C 22 [16]. 
36
 Explanatory Note, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, C 22 [14]. 
37
 S Burns, The Law of Assisted Reproduction (Bloomsbury Professional 2012) 347. 
38
 [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR 1334. See also P Bremner, 'Lesbian parents and biological 
fathers – leave to apply for contact' (2014) 36 JSWFL 83  
39
 Ibid [114].  
40
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 54: the conditions include the birth mother’s 
consent, a genetic link between one of the men and the child, and a family relationship between the 
men. 
41
 For a summary of the case law on granting parental orders and the requirements that need to be 
satisfied see C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The Regulation and Recognition of Surrogacy under English Law: An 
Overview of the Case-Law’ (2015) 27 (1) CFLQ 83. See also M Welstead, ‘The Hurdles Fall: 
Surrogacy and Parental Orders’ (2015) Fam Law 1415. 
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child from birth in the way that a female same-sex couple can be.42 Furthermore, 
single men cannot (at present)43 become lone legal parents in this way, whereas 
single women can make use of the parenthood provisions to become single parents.  
I am not arguing here for symmetry in the approach to gay male and lesbian parents 
given that autonomous gay male parenting would often involve surrogacy, with all its 
attendant ethical, philosophical and practical complications,44 rather than donor 
conception. However, it is noteworthy that the legislature’s reluctance to review 
surrogacy laws has meant that recognition of gay male parenting has been 
overlooked while the recognition of lesbian parenting has improved considerably. 
Therefore, this disparity between the automatic recognition of women-led families 
and its absence for male-led families, as well as the relative procreative difficulties 
encountered by gay men who want children, are key parts of the contextual 
background against which collaborative co-parenting arrangements are formed.  
In addition to the gender-based disparity in the legal recognition of same-sex 
parenthood, the way the parenthood provisions of the HFEA 2008 channel same-sex 
families into a heteronormative model is problematic.45 While recognising the 
progressive nature of some aspects of the reforms, a number of commentators have 
remarked on their limited scope; the reforms do not, for example, apply to female 
couples conceiving at home unless they are in a civil partnership or same-sex 
marriage.46  What is more, the Act does not countenance the legal recognition of 
more than two parents (which collaborative co-parenting arrangements often 
involve). Under this legislation one or more of the adults in a collaborative co-
parenting arrangement cannot be recognised as a parent.47 This is as a result of the 
                                            
42
 This is largely due to the enduring principle of gestation as the default basis for legal parenthood. 
43
 But see Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191, [2016] 2 FLR 327 where Sir James Munby 
declared that it was incompatible with articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR to restrict the availability of 
parental orders to couples. 
44
 See Warnock M, A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Blackwell 1984); See also Horsey K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy 
Arrangements’ (2010) 22 CFLQ 449. 
45
 J Wallbank, ‘Channelling the Messiness of Diverse Family Lives: Resisting the Calls to Order and 
De-Centring the Hetero-Normative Family’ (2010) 32 JSWFL 353. 
46
 Ibid. 354; See also J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family’ (2010) 73 MLR 175, 191. 
47
 Collaborative co-parenting which occurs between two individuals would not necessarily present the 
same difficulties in terms of legal parenthood. 
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deeply entrenched nature of the two-parent model on the legal imagination.48 This 
binary assumption about parental status exacerbates the tensions within 
collaborative co-parenting disputes creating a competition over legal recognition.49 
The failure to allow for the possibility of collaborative co-parenting, therefore, creates 
an environment in which the explicit consideration of the role gay men might play in 
raising children with lesbian co-parents is seen as a threat to autonomous women-
led parenting rather than as an expression of gay men’s procreative consciousness. 
4. Judicial Recognition of Gay Men’s Procreative Consciousness  
In the recent collaborative co-parenting case of H v S,50 the court missed the 
opportunity explicitly to acknowledge the procreative consciousness of gay men and 
allow this to guide their reasoning. Instead, the court was more circumspect in the 
way in which it disposed of the case, treading a fine line between what was in the 
best interests of the chid and what the adults agreed prior to conception. In this 
section, I examine the reasoning in the case in greater depth and suggest ways in 
which gay men’s procreative consciousness might have been usefully used to 
support, what was ultimately, a desirable outcome. Before doing this, however, it is 
necessary to consider what is meant by procreative consciousness and how this 
relates to the way in which gay men are positioned in relation to parenthood.   
The idea of procreative consciousness was developed by US psychologists to 
explain how men, particularly gay men, can feel at a disadvantage in the procreative 
realm. For Marsiglio, men’s procreative consciousness refers to ‘men’s cognitive and 
affective activity within the reproductive realm’.51 There is a considerable body of 
feminist scholarship about women’s experiences of reproduction and having 
                                            
48
 J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the 
Tenacity of the Sexual Family’ (2010) 73 MLR 175. 
49
 For a more in-depth discussion of the problems associated with parental status see C Lind and T 
Hewitt, ‘Law and the complexities of parenting: parental status and parental function’ (2009) 31 
JSWFL 391. 
50
 [2015] EWFC 36, [2016] 1 FLR 723. 
51
 W Marsiglio, ‘Male Procreative Consciousness and Responsibility: A Conceptual Analysis and 
Research Agenda’ (1991) 12 Journal of Family Issues 268, 269. 
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children.52 However, there is a lack of theorising around men’s participation in the 
procreative realm. In the words of Marsiglio et al: 
Every day, all over the world, men think about having babies, imagine 
themselves as parents, struggle with infertility, donate gametes, hear of 
unintended pregnancies, receive news of fetal abnormalities, make 
decisions about abortions, and become parents. Although feminist 
scholarship has centred these experiences in women’s lives, it has 
inadequately explored their meanings in men’s lives.53 
Much of the scholarship on same-sex parenting has focused on the autonomy of 
single women and female couples with the experiences of men being situated in 
relation to female reproductive autonomy.54 However, as Inhorn et al. argue, ‘men 
need to be considered reproductive in their own right’.55  
Traditionally, arguments about the gendered nature of reproduction and caring for 
children relate to how a disproportionate burden of caring duties fall on women 
because it is somehow seen as natural that it should be women who care for 
children. As Smart and Neale comment, 
Feminists have long striven to challenge the myth of motherhood in 
which it has been assumed that the birthing process gives rise to love 
and bonding and that mothers and children unambiguously love one 
another.56 
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However, Beck stresses that the gendered nature of reproduction can cut both ways, 
with men now feeling at a disadvantage in relation to reproduction.57 As Beck 
highlights, ‘... fathers become aware of their disadvantage, partially naturally and 
partially legally. The woman has possession of the child as a product of her womb, 
which we all know does belong to her, biologically and legally...’58 As Marsiglio 
contends, one aspect of men’s procreative consciousness is that ‘at various times 
during their lives men are likely to feel as though many or all of the aspects of the 
reproductive realm are not relevant to them’.59 Writing in the US context, Marsiglio 
argues:  
[males] have seldom had a phenomenological experience comparable, 
or even remotely similar, to what females have experienced during 
gestation and labor. Although it is impossible to determine the extent to 
which these factors have shaped and suppressed males’ procreative 
consciousness and sense of responsibility, it appears that these 
physiological and cultural forces, in combination with more structural 
conditions associated with males’ relationship to the economic and 
family/household spheres of social activity, have had a significant 
impact.60 
Berkowitz and Marsiglio have explicitly applied this conceptual framework of men’s 
procreative consciousness, developed in the context of heterosexual men, to gay 
men who are negotiating their procreative identities.61 Indeed, gay men have 
arguably been conceived of as reproductive beings in their own right to an even 
lesser degree than heterosexual men.  
Historically, gay male identity has been seen as inconsistent with conceiving and 
raising children. This is reinforced by the prejudicial way that the courts have treated 
gay fathers in the past. In Re D (An Infant) Adoption: Parent’s Consent,62 the House 
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of Lords dispensed with the consent of a gay father to the adoption of his child by the 
mother and her new partner on the ground that any reasonable father would 
consent. According to Lord Wilberforce, the father’s refusal to consent ran the risk of 
the child being exposed to experiences which ‘may lead to severance from normal 
society, to psychological stresses and unhappiness and possibly even to physical 
experiences which may scar them for life’.63  
Although lesbians now benefit from greater legislative and judicial recognition as 
parents, they were previously in an analogous position to that which gay men 
currently find themselves in. As recently as 1998, child welfare concerns in relation 
to same-sex parenting were raised within the then Labour government with one 
minister remarking, ‘I am not in favour of gay couples seeking to adopt children 
because I question whether that is the right start in life. We should not see children 
as trophies.’64 These concerns were reflected in early post-separation custody cases 
where the mother has subsequently identified herself as a lesbian. The courts in 
these cases highlighted the risks presented to the child of being raised by a lesbian 
couple, risks which were supposedly exacerbated if the couple were ‘militant 
lesbians’.65 
Since then, however, courts have been explicit about how mindful they are of 
protecting women-led homonuclear families. Re D, 66 (formerly known as Re M 
(Sperm Donor Father),67 for example, is one of the earliest cases involving a known 
sperm donor decided in E&W. At that time, the main way for a lesbian co-mother to 
acquire parental responsibility was through a joint residence order with the birth 
mother, which the lesbian couple had previously obtained. The court in Re D had to 
decide whether to grant parental responsibility to the biological father (Mr B). 
Although the court did give the biological father parental responsibility, Mrs Justice 
Black clearly indicated that she only did so because ‘the grant of parental 
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responsibility to Mr B alongside the sort of undertaking that he offers would amount 
to a grant of a status, stripped of practical effect’.68 Indeed Mrs Justice Black was 
careful to affirm that the family the female couple had formed with the child was 
potentially fragile and deserved protection describing the birth mother’s partner as 
‘the most vulnerable person in this situation, whom society will view to some extent 
as “the cuckoo in the nest”’.69.  
The emphasis that courts place on the protection of the women-led homonuclear 
family is now reinforced by the statutory reforms described in section 3 above. This 
is reflected in Mr Justice Baker’s decision in Re G; Re Z70 discussed in more detail in 
section 5 below. In a sentiment echoing Mrs Justice Black’s remarks in Re D, Mr 
Justice Baker noted that ‘the policy underpinning [the 2008 Act] reforms is an 
acknowledgement that alternative family forms without fathers are sufficient to meet 
a child's need.’71 While the legal position in relation to lesbian mothers has changed 
considerably in recent years from judicial reluctance or opposition to acceptance and 
the desire to protect, the same cannot be said with respect to gay fathers.  
Although Re D (An Infant), discussed above, was decided a number of decades ago 
now, this scathing indictment of gay fatherhood continues to impact detrimentally 
upon the way in which male same-sex parenting is perceived. Mallon notes that: 
Many people, including some child welfare professionals, are more 
than a little uncomfortable discussing gay men who are the primary 
parents raising children…[T]he enduring belief in our society [is] that 
parenting is the natural and sole domain of women…The concepts of 
heterosexuality and parenthood are so inextricably intertwined in our 
culture that the suggestion of gay fatherhood appears alien, unnatural, 
even impossible.72 
Therefore, the perception persists that gay men as parents challenge fundamental 
norms of family life in a way that lesbian parents do not. 
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What is more, there have been a number of qualitative empirical studies where the 
gay male participants seem to have internalised and echoed these sentiments.73 As 
Berkowitz and Marsiglio highlight, for example:  
[F]or some of these men, being socialized into a world that stereotypes 
gay men as pedophiles constrained their ability to envision themselves 
as future fathers. Even worse…it is not uncommon for gay men to 
incorporate these heterosexist myths and irrational stereotypes into 
their own self-concept.74 
Although this particular stereotype did not appear in Heaphy et al.’s recent study of 
civil partnerships,75 they did find that a number of the male couples they interviewed 
felt it was wrong for gay men to become parents. Berkowitz and Marsiglio further 
note that ‘many young childless gay men are apprehensive about becoming fathers 
because they are overly concerned with how outsiders would perceive them’ and 
implicitly their family.76 Another particularly problematic stereotype is the perception 
of the gay male community as being uniformly ‘sexually voracious’ and characterised 
by ‘the freedom to have many sexual partners’.77 This enhances the perception of 
those outside the gay community that gay men are unsuitable primary carers and 
also affects those within the gay community. These studies suggest, therefore, that 
traditional stereotypes about how inconsistent parenting is with the gay male lifestyle 
abound. These stereotypes may have a detrimental effect on those gay men who do 
want to be parents or would wish to feel they had the choice. 
This societal/cultural resistance to the idea of gay male parenthood forms an 
inescapable part of the socio-legal background that surrounds the legal recognition 
of gay men as parents. In light of this, it is important to acknowledge the extra-legal 
effects that legal recognition can have in combating resistance to the recognition of 
gay men as parents. As Kelly notes, ‘law plays a significant role in the lives of 
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marginalized communities, not only because it is capable of extending concrete 
rights to them, but also because of the symbolic content of that action.’78 On this 
basis, the current lack of culturally-embedded support for gay male parenthood is a 
compelling reason why courts should explicitly acknowledge in their reasoning the 
need to recognise gay men as parents, in the way the courts, and legislation, 
currently do in relation to lesbian mothers.    
By way of illustration of this point, the recent collaborative co-parenting case of H v 
S,79 provided an opportunity for the family court to acknowledge and identify the 
interests of gay male parents, which it lamentably did not seize, despite reaching a 
desirable outcome. The case concerned a dispute between a male couple, H and B, 
who were in a long-term relationship but not a civil partnership, and a single woman, 
S. The main issue at stake was the residence of M, a child conceived as a result of a 
reproductive collaboration between the three adults. According to the male couple, 
the child, conceived with H’s sperm and carried to term by S, was to live with H and 
B, and S was to have a subsidiary parenting role. S, however, disputed this, claiming 
that although she and H were to co-parent M, B had not been involved and M was to 
live with S.  
Although the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 was in force when M 
was born in 2014, it did not determine M’s legal parents because S was not married 
and conception did not occur in a licensed fertility clinic. As a matter of common law, 
therefore, S, as the birth mother, was the legal mother and H, determined to be the 
biological father by DNA test, was the legal father.80 Furthermore, a parental order 
under section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 was not 
applicable because that would have extinguished the birth mother’s legal 
parenthood, which none of the parties sought and to which the birth mother did not 
consent. Upon birth, S, who had parental responsibility as the birth mother, 
registered the child under her surname with her as the sole parent. H successfully 
applied for parental responsibility as the biological father before a Deputy District 
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Judge but B was not successful in his application for parental responsibility in the 
same case as he was neither a step-parent nor a parent in terms of the HFEA 2008. 
Consequently, the dispute in H v S was not over legal parenthood but rather 
concerned a child arrangements order and also whether or not B would be awarded 
parental responsibility. The Deputy District Judge ordered that both men were to 
have unsupervised contact with M. H and B were also successful in obtaining a 
prohibited steps order to prevent S from baptising M, which S proceeded to do and 
initially lied to the court about. At the time of the hearing in the Family Court, before 
Russell J, S continued to disrupt contact between M and the male couple but, 
despite that, overnight contact had been occurring and a relationship had developed 
between the men and M. Russell J found that the case did not concern a surrogacy 
arrangement and as such fell to be decided by the ordinary principles contained in 
the Children Act 1989 and, in particular, was governed by the paramountcy of the 
welfare of the child.81 The conclusion the court reached in this regard was that the 
welfare of the child was best served if she lived with H and B, if B had parental 
responsibility and if S was given supervised contact, each of which the court 
ordered. 
This case is particularly noteworthy because of the specific mention of the 
agreement that existed between S and the two men prior to conception in deciding 
what was in the best interests of the child. Russell J noted: 
The circumstances of M's conception and birth are relevant because M 
will, in time, need to understand the background to her birth and, 
secondly, because it will inform and assist the court in reaching its 
decisions to conclude what agreements were made prior to M's 
conception and birth.82 
Russell J’s seeming willingness to take into account pre-conception intentions in the 
context of collaborative co-parenting as a relevant factor, albeit with limited impact 
on the actual outcome, is commendable and should be adopted in subsequent 
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cases.83 This, however, needs to be interpreted in light of the fact that the mother 
also frustrated contact and breached a court order. It is not self-evident that such an 
agreement would be enforced where the mother’s conduct was not brought into 
question. 
The case evidences a lack of conceptual clarity about the relationship between pre-
conception intentions and the best interests of the child. The case involved a child 
arrangements order and parental responsibility order, both of which concern the 
‘upbringing of a child’ and, therefore, child welfare is necessarily the court’s 
paramount concern.84 Lord MacDermott gave the following guidance in relation to 
the paramountcy principle in the seminal case of J v C:85 
‘…when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of 
parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account 
and weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the 
interests of the child’s welfare. That is…the paramount consideration 
because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed’.86 
On this basis, Mary Welstead is critical of what she describes in her comment on H v 
S as an ‘unusual, and Draconian, order to remove a 15-month old baby girl from her 
mother’.87 She argues that the judge placed a surprising amount of emphasis on the 
pre-conception agreement given that the best interests of the child are the court’s 
paramount consideration. Despite this, Welstead accepts that given the judicial 
approach on this matter it would be preferable ‘if all agreements to procreate, 
whether by way of surrogacy, sperm donation, or co-parenting, were to be regulated 
by law. Agreements could then be entered into with the secure knowledge that they 
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would normally be enforced’.88 As I discuss below, however, the wording of the 
judgment is framed in a way that suggests the pre-conception intentions are merely 
a secondary consideration with concerns about the harm the child will suffer with the 
mother taking precedence. Nevertheless, it may be that in this case the best 
interests test is being used as a vehicle for enforcing the pre-conception intentions.    
Lord MacDermott’s dictum above strongly indicates that there will be one particular 
outcome that is most consistent with the child’s best interests. However, such a 
determinative use of child welfare will not always be possible as a number of 
potential outcomes may be broadly consistent with child welfare to a similar 
degree.89 As Zanghellini comments: 
The welfare standard is sufficiently amorphous that, when applied free 
of heteronormative preconceptions about what constitutes ideal 
parenthood and ideal parenting configurations, it will rarely dictate one 
single outcome, rather than suggesting a range of possible outcomes 
equally compatible with the child’s best interest.90 
This suggests that where the welfare principle purportedly does dictate a specific 
outcome, in the absence of any obvious harm to the child, other factors may be 
implicitly influencing this. As Eekelaar puts it, the welfare principle ‘might fail to 
provide sufficient protection to children's interests because its use conceals the fact 
that the interests of others, or, perhaps, untested assumptions about what is good for 
children, actually drive the decision.’91 For example, in some of the collaborative co-
parenting cases the courts have been explicit about the sufficiency of same-sex 
parenting and their desire to protect the homonuclear family.92 However, in other 
cases the way the courts have disposed of the applications suggest that they are 
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considerably influenced by the biological connection between father and child per 
se.93  
Therefore, in cases like H v S, absent any concerns about the mother’s parenting 
style, there is considerable force to the argument that it would have been broadly 
and similarly consistent with the child’s best interests to live with either the mother or 
the father and his partner. The court could then have resolved the dispute in a way 
that would have been equitable for each of the parties. This could have involved 
acknowledging that the gay men’s procreative consciousness has been particularly 
engaged and that gay male parenting is potentially fragile from the point of view of 
legal recognition. There would also have needed to have been a similar 
acknowledgement in relation to single female parenthood. Pre-conception intentions 
could then be used as a means of determining which of the two outcomes, each of 
which are similarly consistent with the child’s welfare, should prevail. This, I submit, 
would have reflected a conceptually clearer and more genuine attempt to achieve 
justice for all involved while ensuring the outcome was consistent with the welfare of 
the child.  
Instead, the court chose to focus on the harm the child is likely to suffer as a result of 
the birth mother’s negative attitude towards the biological father and his partner, as 
well as the birth mother’s parenting style, which the judge described as ‘over 
emotional and highly involved.’94 It is only in passing and incidental to this that pre-
conception intentions are mentioned. Ms Justice Russell emphasises that ‘[i]t is not 
the function of this court to decide on the nature of the agreement between H, B and 
S and then either enforce it or put it in place… M living with H and B and spending 
time with S from time to time fortunately coincides with the reality of her conception 
and accords with M’s identity and place within her family.’95 Essentially, the court is 
indicating that the primary reason that the child will be living with H and B is because 
of the harm the child is likely to suffer with S and it is merely a happy coincidence 
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that this is what was agreed prior to birth. With respect, in my submission these 
priorities should be reversed.  
It seems unnecessary to suggest that in order for the child to be able to live with H 
and B, she would need to be at risk of some harm from living with her birth mother. 
Even if there was no risk of harm, I would suggest that conceiving the child was an 
expression of the gay men’s procreative consciousness, rather than that of the single 
woman, as evidenced by the pre-conception intentions. It is for this reason that the 
child should live with H and B. By emphasising the role the mother's parenting style 
and conduct had in determining the outcome, the court unnecessarily risks invoking 
the 'regressive and questionable...gendered images [of]...unruly and irresponsible 
mums' contrasted with 'safe fathers discursively positioned as seeking contact and 
sharers of responsibilities'.96  
Whether or not the child’s welfare should be the court’s paramount concern in such 
disputes is beyond the scope of this article.97 However, even working within the 
framework of the paramountcy principle, it is possible and necessary to balance the 
interests of the adults involved. Herring advocates ‘relationship-based welfare,’ 
whereby ‘[t]he child's welfare is promoted when he or she lives in a fair and just 
relationship with each parent.’98 Herring suggests this as a means of reconciling 
what may be seen as potentially conflicting interests of children and adults but it is 
also a useful way of conceiving of disputes where the interests of adults do not 
conflict with the welfare of the child but with each other.  This has the advantage of 
avoiding Eekelaar’s criticism that ‘the very ease of the welfare test encourages a 
laziness and unwillingness to pay proper attention to all the interests that are at 
stake in these decisions’.99 On this basis it is legitimate for the courts to use pre-
conception agreements in resolving collaborative co-parenting disputes as a means 
of ensuring a fair outcome that is consistent with relationship-based welfare. As 
Herring and Foster argue, a ‘child’s thriving is crucially dependent on the thriving of 
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all the other stakeholders’.100  Consequently, only by accepting the role that pre-
conception intentions play can courts give effect to the procreative consciousness of 
gay men in a way that acknowledges the psychological utility of legal recognition in 
relation to gay fathers. 
5. Contesting Heteronormativity in the Commentary on Collaborative 
Co-Parenting Disputes 
A number of commentators have noted the influence of heteronormative constructs 
of the family on legal regulation.101 It is important to acknowledge that 
heteronormativity is a contested theoretical concept that cannot be applied to legal 
norms straightforwardly and uncritically. While I have implicitly identified the tensions 
inherent in its application when critiquing the legal framework and acknowledge it is 
not an unproblematic descriptor, I principally use the term ‘heteronormative’ to 
denote the ideal parenting model which requires a sexually intimate couple 
relationship even in the same-sex context. Nevertheless, I adopt Robyn Wiegman 
and Elizabeth Wilson’s recent challenge to queer theory by not ‘assuming a position 
of antinormativity from the outset.’102  In this way, I argue that some of the existing 
readings of the case law too readily identify judicial thinking as ‘heteronormative’. 
The central claim with respect to the heteronormativity of the legal regulation of 
parenthood is that it is wedded to the notion of dyadic gendered parenting.103 In 
relation to lesbian couples who become parents the dyadic or two-parent element is 
not necessarily problematic, particularly for those couples who wish to form a 
homonuclear family.104 However, the gendered element becomes problematic where 
the lesbian couple wish to form a homonuclear family without the involvement of the 
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biological father. This type of family has garnered both legislative and judicial support 
and a number of commentators105 are particularly critical of judicial interventions that 
might jeopardise this. 
However, neither lesbian parenting practices nor families that lesbians form are 
homogenous. While some lesbians wish to form homonuclear families, others seek 
to challenge the traditional model of the family.106 For those lesbians who seek to 
engage in a form of collaborative co-parenting it is the two-parent rather than 
gendered element of the heteronormative legal framework that is problematic. 
Therefore, while some may perceive a legal framework that facilitates the 
involvement of the biological father alongside a lesbian couple as heteronormative 
because it promotes gendered parenting,107 others may perceive a legal framework 
that did not facilitate the involvement of the biological father alongside a lesbian 
couple as heteronormative because it promoted dyadic parenting based on 
conjugality.108 
The case of Re G; Re Z,109 and the commentary on it, provide a good illustration of 
the inherent complexity in the idea of heteronormative conceptions of the family and 
the need for more sophisticated, nuanced analyses of judicial reasoning in this area. 
The case also provides an opportunity to examine these issues where it is a female 
couple’s position as main caregivers that is perceived to be under threat, rather than 
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a male couple as in H v S. Re G; Re Z concerns distinct but related applications by 
two men for leave to apply for orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (i.e. 
residence and/or contact orders as they were then). In each of the cases, a child was 
conceived using the man’s sperm and was born to a woman in a civil partnership. 
Since the adoption of the HFEA 2008, the civil partners were the legal parents and 
the biological father had no legal parental status. As a result, the biological father 
was not 'entitled to apply for a section 8 order’ with respect to the child'.110 Instead, 
he required 'the leave of the court to make the application'.111 This case, therefore, 
turned on whether the men should be granted leave to apply for such orders rather 
than on whether such orders should actually be granted. 
The facts of the two cases are separate but linked. D and E, two women in a long-
term relationship (by the time of the birth of the child, civil partners) approached a 
male couple with whom they were friendly (S and T). The male couple were also in a 
long-term relationship, subsequently becoming civil-partners, and the two couples 
discussed the possibility of having a child. S agreed to be the biological father of a 
child born to E. In December 2008, shortly after D and E's civil partnership, F was 
born as a result of home insemination. At this stage, the 2008 reforms had not come 
into force and, therefore, S was one of F's legal parents and had an automatic right 
to apply to the court for an order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989. Following 
F's birth, there seems to have been regular contact between S and F, although the 
frequency and quality of that contact was disputed. About a year after F's birth, E 
became pregnant again following home insemination using S’s sperm and 
subsequently gave birth to G.  
At the same time that E was pregnant with F, T provided sperm for X and Y (who 
were friends of D and E) and X subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to Z. 
Following birth, there was regular contact between T and Z. However, E sought to 
restrict contact after disagreements arose over T’s assertion that he was the child’s 
father rather a sperm donor. As G and Z were born to women in civil partnerships, 
following the coming into force of the 2008 act, S applied for leave to apply for a 
contact and residence order in respect of G, and T applied for leave to apply for a 
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contact order in respect of Z. In granting leave to apply for the contact orders (but not 
a residence order), Baker J held that biological fathers in the applicants’ position 
should not automatically be denied leave to apply for an order under section 8 of the 
Children Act 1989. He concluded on the basis of the facts of the case that the 
women had allowed relationships to develop between the biological fathers and the 
children, which suggested they should be granted leave to apply for a contact order. 
Rosie Harding draws on this case to demonstrate that ‘the implicit heteronormativity 
of the family survive[s] in contemporary…judicial discourse.’112 Furthermore, she 
characterises the case as ‘the reinscription of heteronormative understandings of 
family into a situation where the children in question were legally fatherless’.113 
However, this is not immediately apparent from the outcome of the case. The effect 
of the decision was not, in fact, to make any orders relating to the biological father’s 
relationships with the children but to grant them the opportunity to make their case in 
court just as any other adult with a close relationship with the child (such as a 
grandparent) might. As Baker J noted:  
…no other person is absolutely excluded from seeking redress 
and…biological fathers who are deprived of legal parenthood by the 
2008 Act should be treated no differently. Had parliament intended that 
a person in a position of the applicants in this case should be entirely 
stripped of legal remedies, it would have expressly provided that a 
person in the position of S and T in these circumstances would be 
disqualified even from seeking the court’s leave.114 
Furthermore, Baker J makes it clear that granting leave to apply is more about 
providing the biological father with access to justice than a sense that the 
substantive case will or should succeed. He stresses that ‘it is well established that 
the granting of leave under s.10 (9) does not create a presumption in favour of a 
substantive order’.115 In his conclusion he further emphasises this point, perhaps 
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even indicating that their chances of success are slimmer than the biological fathers 
may anticipate: 
‘I make it clear, however, that it does not follow that any substantive 
order for contact will be made in either case. Furthermore, if contact is 
ordered, it may well be significantly less frequent than the applicants 
are seeking’.116 
However, Harding’s criticisms are not primarily aimed at the outcome of the case but 
the use of language in the judgment.  
Harding cites Baker J’s use of ‘biological father’ to refer to the applicant rather than 
the respondents’ preferred term of ‘known donor’ in support of her argument. In 
Harding’s submission: 
‘By referring to the men as ‘biological fathers’, Baker J is drawing the 
discursive power of ‘father’ on to their side of the dispute.117 
Other commentators have made the link between reference to ‘biological father’ in 
Re G; Re Z and the promotion of heteronormative understandings of the family. 
Brown, for example, notes that ‘[Baker J’s] chosen language suggests that the 
judgment is underpinned by assumptions and ideals that promote the traditional, 
heterosexual, ‘nuclear family’ model’.118 However, in evaluating Harding’s and 
Brown’s criticisms of Baker J’s reference to the biological father as a way of 
reasserting the heteronormative family model, it is necessary to bear in mind the 
specific context in which these comments were made. Had the case concerned a 
female couple who had adopted a child or had conceived with the sperm of an 
unknown donor, it would have been a very different scenario. In those situations, it is 
unlikely the father would make any sort of parental claim and in the latter situation 
would not even know the child existed. It is also unlikely that the court would 
contemplate allowing such a claim. Therefore, it seems that any underlying 
normative assumptions (such as right to knowledge of biological origins) would be 
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applied in a similar way to a same-sex couple as to a different-sex couple without 
any suggestion that a heteronormative bias would result in different treatment.        
Both Harding and Brown uncritically accept the female couples’ characterisation of 
the arrangements in Re G; Re Z, namely that the men were sperm donors who 
facilitated the female couples’ desires to have children. They seem not to draw any 
distinction in this regard between sperm donors who are known to the couple and 
those who are not. However, the reproductive involvement of a man who is known to 
the family creates a different set of considerations that needs to be judged differently 
from unknown donation. Therefore, the way Baker J uses the term ‘biological father’ 
is not as straightforwardly heteronormative as it might have been had the case 
involved conception with an unknown donor.119  
It is important to acknowledge that ‘dyadic’, ‘gendered’ and ‘resulting from a conjugal 
relationship’ are each elements of heteronormative parenting. In the interests of 
conceptual clarity, it is necessary that critiques of judicial dicta from the point of view 
of heteronormativity identify which of these elements are engaged. Therefore, I 
advocate for more nuanced analyses of judicial attempts to allow for the possibility of 
collaborative co-parenting families. This requires recognition that legal provisions or 
judicial dicta that seem potentially heteronormative in one respect may in fact be 
necessary in order to resist heteronormativity in other ways. A key feature of this 
more nuanced approach is the recognition that judicial attempts to accommodate the 
interests of gay fathers, and as a result give effect to the procreative consciousness 
of gay men, are not inherently heteronormative. 
This is not to suggest, however, that such attempts cannot be heteronormative. It 
remains important to ensure that the justifications behind legislative and judicial 
approaches are genuine and are not merely disguised versions of heteronormativity. 
Furthermore, I am not suggesting that the judge in Re G; Re Z was motivated by a 
desire to accommodate collaborative co-parenting or to give effect to the procreative 
consciousness of gay men. It may well be that the judge was indeed influenced by a 
heteronormative view of the family as Harding and Brown suggest. My argument is 
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that this is not an inevitable conclusion from the fact that the judge did not refer to 
the biological father as a known donor nor from the fact that he did not foreclose the 
possibility of an application for contact. It’s possible that this was an appropriate 
approach based on the type of collaborative co-parenting arrangement that was 
being created. Whether or not this was what guided the court in Re G; Re Z would 
have been clearer had the judge explicitly considered the procreative consciousness 
of the gay men involved. Nevertheless, it is important to remain open-minded about 
the possibility that recognising the interests of gay fathers in collaborative co-
parenting disputes, rather than imposing a heteronormative vision of the family, may 
in fact be a vital part of accommodating the plurality of same-sex families. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have advocated for greater judicial cognisance of the interests of gay 
fathers, alongside existing awareness of the needs of lesbian mothers, in resolving 
collaborative co-parenting disputes. In doing this, the article has highlighted the 
rigidity of the existing legislative framework, which promotes a particular form of 
same-sex parenting. This framework does not allow for any judicial discretion in the 
determination of a child’s legal parents following assisted reproduction. However, in 
cases such as H v S when deciding with whom a child will live and who has parental 
responsibility for that child, the court has discretion to determine which arrangement 
is in the child’s best interests. In doing this, judges should explicitly consider and 
discuss the emerging and potentially fragile procreative consciousness of the gay 
fathers involved, alongside the protection of women-led parenting, in a relationship-
based assessment of the child’s welfare.  
Genuine judicial attempts to engage with the interests of gay fathers in collaborative 
co-parenting disputes should not be labelled simply as heteronormative. Attempts to 
include gay fathers alongside lesbian mothers might, at first sight, appear to promote 
a different-sex parenting model. However, failure to consider the interests of gay 
fathers as well as lesbian couples is heteronormative in a different way because it 
automatically prioritises dyadic parenting based on the sexually intimate couple. 
Allowing for the potential development of a relationship between gay fathers and 
children in collaborative co-parenting families does not necessarily mean that 
biological fathers are being unjustifiably imposed on women-led families. Future 
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judicial attempts to accommodate the parental desires and needs of gay men in 
collaborative co-parenting disputes, if and when they arise, should be seen as 
representing a willingness to engage with gay men as something other than 
reproductive outsiders,120 who are disenfranchised from parenthood in a way that 
lesbians no longer are. Only in this way can 'the recognition of the multi-layered, 
gendered dimensions of the emotional factors that impel participants on all sides of 
this debate' occur.121  
                                            
120
 For more on this see J Millbank, ‘Unlikely Fissures and Uneasy Resonances: Lesbian Co-Mothers, 
Surrogate Parenthood and Fathers’ Rights’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 141, 143. 
121
 R Collier, 'Men, Gender and Fathers' Rights "After Legal Equality" in R Leckey (Ed), After Legal 
Equality (2015 Routledge) p 67. 
